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ABSTRACT 
The United States has a growing vested interest in the geopolitical status of 
Africa, as reflected in guiding national strategic documents. United States Africa 
Command (AFRICOM) was established in 2008 to effectively manage many of the key 
strategic issues surrounding Africa.  One of AFRICOM’s areas of focus is the relatively 
unsecured and lawless maritime environment of coastal Sub-Saharan Africa, which 
suffers from a myriad of security threats, including piracy and trafficking in drugs, 
persons, and weapons. In order to gain insight into how best to fully operationalize U.S. 
strategy in the African maritime environment, this thesis turns to two regions of the world 
where the United States has extensive experience countering maritime security threats, 
either directly or through significant assistance to regional states.  The drug war in the 
Caribbean and antipiracy efforts in Southeast Asia are studied to determine the effect of 
two independent variables, that of coordination (both interagency and international) and 
maritime security capacity (the ability to man, train and equip security forces), on the 
flow of drugs through the Caribbean and rate of piracy in Southeast Asia. This thesis 
finds that while each has a positive effect on both security threats, the combination of 
robust coordination at the interagency and international levels and enhanced maritime 
security capacity was key to success in counterdrug and antipiracy operations.  The 
implications of these findings for U.S. strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa are discussed in the 
conclusion. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The coastal Sub-Saharan African region is characterized by an environment in 
which maritime security threats such as trafficking of drugs, arms, diamonds, oil, persons 
endangered species and fish poaching to rage unchecked.1 The level of threat posed is 
reinforced by weak state structures, political instability and rampant corruption.2  In 
2006, the United States recognized the “growing geo-strategic importance” of Africa in 
its National Security Strategy (NSS), defining drug trafficking and piracy as irregular 
challenges to U.S. national security, potentially requiring unconventional approaches to 
countering these threats.3 This new focus on Africa built upon earlier strategy documents, 
to include the National Defense Strategy (NDS) of 2005, which lists the “securing of 
strategic access… to the global commons,” which includes international waters, as part of 
its strategic objectives, and the National Military Strategy (NMS) of 2004, which states 
that the overseas presence posture “must also improve conditions in key regions.”4 The 
National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) of 2005 highlights piracy and drug 
trafficking as security threats, while adding the prevention of criminal or hostile acts as 
one of its objectives.5 The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21), 
signed by the heads of the United States Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, asserts 
that “seapower will be a unifying force for building a better tomorrow,” and commits the 
                                                 
1 Adekeye Adabajo, “Introduction,” in West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a 
Troubled Region ed. Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2004), 2; Audra K. 
Grant, “Smuggling and Trafficking in Africa,” in Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking in 
Arms, Drugs and Human Life ed. Kimberly L. Thachuk (Wesport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 
113–116; Milan Vesely, “Plundering Africa's Sea Wealth,” African Business, no.259 (November 2000), 
18–19.  www.proquest.com (Accessed April 2, 2009). 
2 Adabajo, 2; Grant, 113–116; Vesely, 18–9. 
3 U.S. National Security Council, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (March 
2006), 37, 43–4. 
4 U.S. Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (March 
2005), 6; U.S. Department of Defense: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the 
United States of America (2004), 22. 
5 United States National Security Council, National Strategy for Maritime Security, (September 2005), 
5, 8. 
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United States to assisting its allies in securing their own maritime environments.6 On 
October 1, 2008, the United States established U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), a 
fully funded operational geographic Combatant Commander (COCOM) whose primary 
area of responsibility (AOR) is the continent of Africa and its surrounding waters. 
AFRICOM’s mission statement embodies all of these strategic tenets: 
United States Africa Command, in concert with other U.S. government 
agencies and international partners, conducts sustained security 
engagement through military-to-military programs, military-sponsored 
activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and 
secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign policy.7 
However, none of this guidance establishes the means for operationalizing the 
strategic and mission objectives. The purpose of this thesis is to seek to fill that gap.  
Since the United States has little experience operating in the Sub-Saharan Africa 
maritime environment, this thesis turns elsewhere for lessons learned that in responding 
to the security threats currently faced in Africa. Although every regional maritime 
security situation is unique, past experience in other regions provides valuable lessons for 
U.S. efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Counterdrug operations in the Caribbean have met 
with significant success, as have antipiracy operations in Southeast Asia. What specific 
factors contributed to these successes, and how can lessons learned can be applied to the 
contemporary Sub-Saharan African maritime security environment? 
A. BACKGROUND OF THE MARITIME SECURITY THREATS IN AFRICA 
As previously stated, Sub-Saharan Africa faces a myriad of maritime security 
threats. For example, “Angola, Namibia and South Africa… [have long been] cocaine 
trafficking routes for Brazilian cartels,” although in recent years, West Africa has 
emerged as the major stopover point for cocaine shipments between South America and 
                                                 
6 U.S. Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security Joint Publication. “A 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.” on The Official Webpage of the United States Navy. 
(Washington, DC: October, 2007) http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf  (Accessed 12 
October 2008), 7, 13. 
7 United States Africa Command, “About USAFRICOM,” AFRICOM Website, 
http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp (Accessed 06 June 2009). 
 3
Europe.8  An estimated seven million small arms and light weapons have been illegally 
trafficked to West Africa since the end of the Cold War.9  As of mid-2008, more than 
twenty percent of diamonds were traded illicitly, along with approximately 70,000 to 
500,000 barrels of oil annually from the Niger Delta alone.10  Both the Gulf of Aden and 
the Gulf of Guinea have high incidences of piracy.  Piracy in the area has increased 
exponentially, and at one time over a dozen ships were being held for ransom by Somali 
pirates, including one full of Soviet era tanks allegedly bound for South Sudan in 
violation of arms embargoes, and the first U.S. flagged ship to be captured in over 200 
years.11  This massive amount of smuggling and other criminal activity occurs either 
beyond the reach of state security apparatuses, or sometimes with the complicity of 
government officials, and therefore requires external assistance in curbing it.12  
For its part, in AFRICOM, despite this formal geographic designation, all of the 
personnel and equipment for this newly independent command will continue to be 
located in Stuttgart, Germany and the majority of its operational and material support will 
continue to be drawn from U.S. European Command (EUCOM), which formerly had 
operational responsibility for most of Africa. The only presence the U.S. military 
currently maintains in Africa is in Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa (HOA). Naval forces 
operating in the AFRICOM AOR will continue to be under divided control. Those ships 
conducting East Africa, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea missions will be controlled by Fifth 
Fleet under CENTCOM, based in Bahrain; those forces operating in the Mediterranean 
                                                 
8 Grant, 117; UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Cocaine Trafficking in Western Africa: Situation 
Report,” on United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime http://www.unodc.org/pdf/dfa/Cocaine-trafficking-
Africa-en.pdf (Accessed 13 April 2009), 9. 
9 Comfort Ero and Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, “Small Arms, Light Weapons,” in West Africa’s 
Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region eds. Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid 
(Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2004), 225. 
10 Grant, 121; Andrew Walker, “Blood Oil Dripping from Nigeria,” BBC (27 July 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7519302.stm (accessed 08 June 2009). 
11 “Somalia: UN Envoy Likens Piracy Off Somalia to 'Blood Diamonds' Trafficking,” United Nations 
News Service (New York: 29 September 2008) archived on All Africa 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200809300031.html  (Accessed 12 October 2008); “Kenya Dismisses Tanks 
'Evidence',” BBC (London: 8 October 2008) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7658598.stm (Accessed 12 
October 2008); Naval War College Foundation,“Workshop Examines Scourge of Piracy,” The Bridge 
Volume 4 (May 2009), 20. 
12 John Bamidele, “Nigeria: Faces of Illegal Bunkering,” Daily Independent (Lagos: 22 November 
2008) http://allafrica.com/stories/200811241096.html (Accessed 2 June 2009). 
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and the Gulf of Guinea will be controlled by Sixth Fleet under EUCOM, based in Naples. 
The naval assets operated by AFRICOM range from surface and subsurface combatants, 
to amphibious ships loaded with Marines to U.S. Coast Guard Cutters. These operations 
mostly occur under the auspices of the Africa Partnership Station, headed by Commander 
Naval Forces Europe / Africa through Commander 6th Fleet. The antipiracy mission of 
the HOA is carried out by Task Force 151 (CTF151) under Commander 5th Fleet. 
Since the United States has relatively little experience operating in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, this thesis turns elsewhere for lessons learned that may be applicable to the 
security threats currently faced in Africa. The United States has experience in securing 
other maritime regions against many of these same threats, whether unilaterally, with 
major power allies (such as Japan or the United Kingdom), or by enhancing regional 
states’ maritime security capacity.  Although every regional maritime security situation is 
unique, past experience in other regions can provide valuable lessons for U.S. efforts in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  Counterdrug operations in the Caribbean have met with significant 
success, as have antipiracy operations in Southeast Asia. This thesis examines the 
specific factors that have been associated with these successes and how they can be 
applied to the contemporary Sub-Saharan African maritime security environment. 
B. MARITIME STRATEGY IN THE CARIBBEAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 
The literature on general maritime strategy and operations offers little insight into 
the sources of success in regional maritime security. One theory posed in literature on 
U.S. maritime security strategy that the “Navy’s forward presence is more than likely to 
produce economic benefits to the United States and other major industrial economies” by 
securing the sea lines of communication (SLOC), a conclusion easily applied to regional 
and local powers when scaled to their territorial waters.13  The mechanics of how that 
naval presence works to secure maritime environments are generally not spelled out, and 
the focus on naval presence also tends to ignore the role played by other arms of 
government in maritime security assistance to weaker states. Most naval strategists 
                                                 
13 Robert E. Looney, “Market Effects of Naval Presence in a Globalized World: A Research 
Summary,” in Globalization and Maritime Power ed. Sam J. Tangredi (Washington: National Defense 
University Press, 2002), 128. 
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generally focus on the role of naval forces in wartime scenarios, with little mention of the 
types of security threats that affect global commerce and developing states in their 
maritime environments.14 Many of these same theorists, along with a few additional ones 
do hold that forward presence, while generally focused on affecting the behavior of state 
actors, has the additional benefit of securing the seas against other, lesser, criminal 
threats, though few expound on the operationalizing of such presence and how to 
effectively counter specific threats.15  
The few studies that do focus on regional maritime security in peacetime also 
articulate general arguments, going so far as to label the overarching concepts as 
“maintaining good order at sea,” without producing useable lessons, only policy 
recommendations.16  For instance, Knight notes that “smaller Western navies learn how 
to fully utilize the C3I [Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence] potential 
available to them by virtue of their association with the U.S. Navy” and argues that the 
same is true for peacetime operations, and perhaps non-Western allies. 17  He gives no 
specifics on how or under what conditions this transfer of capabilities can be expected to 
take place. Delamer also highlights the importance of inter-naval cooperation through 
training and combined exercises in advancing maritime security, offering no explanation 
                                                 
14 Norman Friedman, Seapower as Strategy: Navies and National Interests (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 2001); Harold J. Kearsley, Maritime Power and the Twenty First Century (Aldershot, 
England: Dartmouth Publishing, 1992); John B. Hattendorf,  Naval History and Maritime Strategy: 
Collected Essays (Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing Company, 2000); The Changing Face of Maritime 
Power eds. Andrew Dorman, Mike Lawrence Smith and Matthew R. H. Uttley, (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1999); Maritime Security and Peacekeeping: A Framework for United Nations Operations ed. 
Michael Pugh (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994); Daniel Goure, The Role of Seapower in 
U.S. National Security in the Twenty-First Century: A Consensus Report of the CSIC Working Group on 
Undersea Warfare, (Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998). 
15 James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1991, Second Edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
1991); Sam Bateman, Navigational Rights and Freedoms and the New Law of the Sea (New York: 
Springer, 2000.) 
16 Sam Bateman, Joshua Ho and Jane Chan, “Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia,” RSIS Policy 
Paper (Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, April 2009), 
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/policy_papers/RSIS_Policy%20Paper%20-
%20Good%20Order%20at%20Sea_270409.pdf (accessed 10 June 2009), 4. 
17 D. W. Knight, “The Impact of Technology on Maritime Security: A User Perspective,” in Maritime 
Forces in Global Security eds. Ann L. Griffiths and Peter T. Haydon (Halifax: Dalhousie University Center 
for Foreign Policy Studies, 1995), 79. 
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of how this is accomplished, and no evidence to support the assertion.18  Till argues that 
the best option for a nation to secure its own waters is to develop a navy modeled on the 
U.S. Coast Guard, but gives no further explanation as to how to go about doing this or 
how the U.S. or any other power can best assist such a venture.19 Murphy’s study of 
piracy highlights the importance of the political “will to suppress piracy” without giving 
explanation of variations in political will over time or space, or to how to cultivate it 
when it is lacking.20 Boyer argues that lack of will “results in poor maritime threat 
awareness, land-centric approaches to policy, and the overwhelming of government 
authorities by the magnitude of maritime security challenges,”21 but again does not 
account for variation in levels of will or articulate a means of generating it. A RAND 
Corporation study on maritime security concludes that U.S. efforts could focus on 
increasing the coastal security and capabilities of strategic maritime states and could also 
develop initiatives for better ship security without examining the mechanics of such 
actions or how different kinds of initiatives may help or hinder efforts against various 
threats to maritime security.22  Finally, the 2007 National Research Council study on the 
1000-Ship Navy Concept offers generally vague recommendations on maritime security 
strategy that tend to focus on how the U.S. can best prepare its own forces for dealing 
with other states. 23  In a lone exception to the rule, Coll offers a detailed argument on 
how to improve maritime security, focusing on language training and military to military 
personal engagement at the micro level and humanitarian operations at the macro level, 
                                                 
18 Guillermo R. Delamer, “Prospects for Multinational Cooperation at Sea in the South Atlantic,” in 
Maritime Forces in Global Security eds. Ann L. Griffiths and Peter T. Haydon (Halifax: Dalhousie 
University Center for Foreign Policy Studies, 1995),  169–79. 
19 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 
2004), 338–350. 
20 Martin N. Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to International 
Security (New York: Routledge, 2007), 26. 
21 Alan Lee Boyer, “Maritime Security Cooperation,” Naval War College Newport Papers no. 29 ed. 
Derek S. Reveron ([2007]), 43–58, 48. 
22 Peter Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges 
for the United States, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), xv. 
23 The 1,000 Ship Navy: Maritime Security Partnerships (Washington: The National Academies Press, 
2007). http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12029.html (Accessed 8 November 2008). 
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but all of the initiatives he advocates are designed to enhance the U.S. relationship with 
allies in the event of a war, and do not focus at all on allies’ own maritime interests.24 
Studies that have focused on specific regions and specific maritime security 
threats are in general agreement on overarching principles, but are usually a dearth of 
attention to detail regarding specific operational and tactical level effects on the maritime 
security threat in question. With respect to the Caribbean maritime environment 
specifically, the most comprehensive work has been done by Richard J. Quirk, who offers 
the usual generic argument for training and cooperation, though recognizing that the U.S. 
must accommodate the “individual needs and financial capabilities” of Caribbean 
states.25  Furthermore, regarding the overarching counterdrug effort, there is a consensus 
in this literature that “there is no War on Drugs, any more than there was actually a war 
on poverty” under President Johnson. 26  Drohan criticizes the U.S. effort as too heavily 
focused on the military aspect of ‘the war’ and instead urges a more economic based 
approach that deals with both the supply and demand sides of the problem.27  Academic 
works tend to focus on the complexity of the economics and politics of the drug trade on 
the land side, and when the maritime environment is studied, typically the focus falls to 
“aspects of both the physical and social geography of the Caribbean” rather than a 
detailed examination of U.S. counter-narcotics strategy. 28  Other studies focus more on 
the supply side effects of drug interdiction on land.29  Policy analyses by think tanks, the 
General Accounting Office and the Congressional Research Service tend to focus on the 
                                                 
24 Alberto Coll, “The Role of the Naval Services in Operations Other Than War: Peacetime 
Engagement and Chaos Management,” in The Role of Naval Forces in 21st-Century Operations eds. 
Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (Washington: Brassey’s, 2000), 85–91. 
25 Richard J. Quirk, “Latin American and the Caribbean,” in The Role of Naval Forces in 21st-Century 
Operations eds. Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (Washington: Brassey’s, 2000), 132. 
26 William H. Drohan “Narco-Mercantilism and the War on Drugs: Is Victory an Option?” Defense 
Intelligence Journal vol. 10, no. 2 (Summer 2001) 41–52, 44. 
27 Ibid, 51. 
28 Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege, (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 54. 
29 See Colletta A Youngers and Eileen Rosin, eds., Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The 
Impact of U.S. Policy (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2005); Dan Caldwell and Robert E. Williams, Jr. “Drugs 
and Thugs: Trafficking and International Security” Chapter 8 in Seeking Security in an Insecure World 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006) 
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effect of economic rather than military measures in reducing supply and/or harsher 
penalties for users and distributors to reduce demand.30 The only major public study 
conducted by the Department of Defense reviews Caribbean operations from 1989–1997 
and concludes that they were effective based on piecemeal anecdotes.31 Bryan claims that 
drug smuggling is best addressed by a broad multifaceted approach that includes 
“promotion of free trade… and closer cooperation with key Caribbean nations.”32 
Zarickson identifies lessons learned, based on bullet points taken from the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, but provides no critical analysis of how they can be more 
broadly applied and further operationalized elsewhere. He identifies several keys to 
tactical success, generally asserting that interdiction is best achieved when drug 
traffickers are forced into using certain routes and means of transport, and emphasizing 
that “intelligence is critical to successful operations” and “the interaction of government 
agencies and foreign governments helps increase success,” without providing any 
analysis or evidence in support of these assertions.33  
With respect to piracy, the literature generally focuses on the factors favoring 
piracy ashore without much attention given to the specific operations and tactics 
employed in antipiracy efforts at sea. Banlaoi’s study of Southeast Asian piracy identifies 
economic, geographic, and institutional causes:  “pervasive poverty, the low level of 
economic development and the poor quality of governance” along with a “huge coastline, 
lax port security measures, weak maritime security forces and limited anti-piracy 
                                                 
30 Jonathan P. Caulkins, Peter Reuter, Martin Y. Iguchi, James Chiesa, How Goes the “War on 
Drugs”?, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Drug Policy Research Center, 2005), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2005/RAND_OP121.pdf (Accessed 2 June 2009); U.S. 
General Accounting Office,, Drug Control: U.S. Efforts in Latin American and the Caribbean, 
GAO/NSIAD-00-09R, http://archive.gao.gov/f0302/163258.pdf (Accessed 2 November 2008); Mark P. 
Sullivan, Caribbean Region: Issues in U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service Report RL32160 
(27 October 2006) http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/76937.pdf (Accessed 9 December 2008). 
31 Alexander G. Monroe Caribbean Barrier: U.S. Atlantic Command Support of Counterdrug 
Operations 1989–1997 (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command Historian, 2000) 79–80. 
32 Anthony Bryan, “The New Clinton Administration and the Caribbean: Trade, Security and 
Regional Politics,” Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 101–120, (Spring 
1997), 116. www.ebscohost.com (Accessed 4 March 2009). 
33 James L. Zackrison, “Smuggling and the Caribbean: Tainting Paradise Throughout History,” in 
Transnational Threats: Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs and Human Life ed. Kimberly L. 
Thachuk (Wesport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 187. 
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cooperation,”34 but concludes simply that major powers must enhance the capability of 
weaker states, without addressing the question of how to go about achieving this broad 
objective given the host of root causes identified.35  Bradford’s study of securing 
Southeast Asian waterways from all variety of transnational threats identifies five factors 
that can enable greater cooperation: “(1) relaxing sovereignty sensitivities, (2) alignment of 
extra-regional power interests, (3) increasing prevalence of cooperation norms, (4) improving 
state resource capabilities, and (5) increasing prioritization of maritime security.” 36  Young 
reaches similar conclusions about land based factors favoring piracy and makes 
recommendations for combating piracy on the land side of the problem. 37  Virginia 
Lunsford analyzes historical evidence dating from the “Golden Age of Piracy” (1570–
1730).”38  She concludes that “long-term intractable and flourishing piracy is a complex 
activity that relies on five integral factors: an available population of potential recruits, a 
secure base of operations, a sophisticated organization, some degree of outside support, 
and cultural bonds that engender vibrant group solidarity.”39  Lunsford suggests that 
“activities that interfere with the smooth workings of any of these factors weaken 
piracy’s sustainability.”40  However, analysis of how that disruption is best achieved is 
not provided.  Bateman and Bates’ study of the region as a whole expands on Cable’s 
principle of gunboat diplomacy, wherein presence theoretically makes a positive impact 
on security threats, but gives no analysis of how presence translates into improved 
                                                 
34 Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Maritime Security Outlook for Southeast Asia,” in The Best of Times, the 
Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific eds. Joshua Ho and Catherine Zara Raymond 
(Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2005), 62. 
35 Ibid, 73. 
36 John Bradford, “Southeast Asian Maritime Security in the Age of Terror: Threats, Opportunity, and 
Charting the Course Forward,” Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies Working Paper no. 75 
(Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, 2005), 16.  
37 Adam J. Young, Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: History, Causes and Remedies 
(Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2007). 
38 Virginia Lunsford, “What Makes Piracy Work?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings vol. 134 no. 12 
(December 2008), 28–33, 28. 
39 Ibid, 29. 
40 Ibid, 29. 
 10
maritime security capacity. Similarly, his discussion of cooperation remains at the 
political as opposed the operational level.41  
Because the bulk of the literature on U.S. maritime security strategy is narrowly 
focused on how the U.S. can better its own forces as opposed to assisting other states in 
securing their own waters, it is difficult to extract useable lessons to assist the U.S. Navy 
in applying those lessons to a new region. The general argument that the presence of 
naval or maritime security forces tends to curb illegal behavior is not supported by hard 
evidence and does not identify specific causal mechanisms, which limits its usefulness 
for strategy development.  Therefore, this thesis analyzes the impact of increased 
international cooperation and maritime security capacity on Caribbean Counter Drug 
Operations and Southeast Asian Anti-Piracy Operations, in order to identify specific 
causal mechanisms as well as important antecedent conditions for effective regional 
maritime security strategy in those regions.  The conclusion then assesses the 
implications of these lessons for maritime security strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa, in 
light of the causal mechanisms and antecedent conditions identified in the preceding 
chapters.  
C. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis consists of two process-tracing case studies of regions in which the 
United States and its allies have had significant experience combating a specific set of 
threats in order to establish more concrete lessons for possible application to Africa.  
Within each case study, lessons are identified based on new analysis of primary data and 
reconsideration of findings of existing secondary sources with a new focus on bridging 
the gap between the policy and operational levels. The implications of these lessons for 
maritime strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa are then assessed. While many maritime 
environments experience multiple threats, the regional analyses focus on the primary 
security concern in each, though allowing for conceptual overlap as appropriate, such as 
in a potential trend where the drug trade and piracy may be carried out by the same 
                                                 
41 Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates, editors, Calming the Waters: Initiatives for Asia Pacific Maritime 
Cooperation, (Canberra Australia: Australian National University, 1996). 
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actors.  Also, since each region has tended to have different government and private 
stakeholders and therefore different data available, each section does not necessarily 
reflect another, though the final synthesis accounts for such dissonance. 
Each chapter includes a regional and topical introduction that outlines 
international legal definitions and norms applicable to the topic. First, the Caribbean 
region is analyzed for U.S. and allied efforts in combating the drug trade. Second, 
Southeast Asia, particularly the Straits of Malacca area, is analyzed for anti-piracy 
efforts. The final chapter discusses the implications for U.S. maritime security strategy in 
Sub-Saharan Africa by establishing the geographical and political parallels between each 
topical regional and the applicable portion(s) of coastal Sub-Saharan African where topic 
specific lessons will likely apply.  Finally, returning to the concept that Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s maritime environment faces the full gamut of international maritime crime, a 
synthesis of all lessons learned from each regional and topical within-case studies is 
made to enable a whole government approach for the United States to best execute its 
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II. COUNTERING DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 
On June 1, 1971, President Richard Nixon announced a new U.S. policy against 
illegal drugs, dubbed the “War on Drugs” by many national newspapers.42  Inspired by 
the ease of attaining hard drugs such as heroin at relatively low prices abroad, and the 
consequent addiction of U.S. servicemen in Vietnam and students in Europe, the policy 
asserted that drug use was a “social problem” that required the full attention of the federal 
government. 43  Alongside education about the dangers of drug use, treatment for addicts, 
and harsh punishments for anyone involved in trafficking, a central goal of the new 
policy was to “stop illicit drugs at their sources.”44  This resulted in multiple federal 
agencies committing significant resources to stemming the flow of illegal drugs into the 
United States. Since the Reagan administration, efforts have focused on the Caribbean, a 
route initially preferred by drug traffickers due to the close proximity of weak and/or 
hostile Caribbean states often unable or unwilling to control drug trafficking to the 
United States.45   
Clausewitz defines war as “an act of force to compel [one’s] enemy to [one’s] 
will.”46 The War on Drugs connotes the application of force by military and law 
enforcement agencies to compel drug traffickers to desist from smuggling drugs into the 
United States.  The effectiveness of the War on Drugs, and more specifically the 
maritime aspect of it, can be measured by its impact on the amount of illegal drugs 
flowing into the United States. The evidence shows that the War on Drugs failed to affect 
                                                 
42 Robert Young "Special Stress on GIs in Viet: Nixon Vows War on Use, Sale of Dope." Chicago 
Tribune (1963-Current file), June 2, 1971, http://www.proquest.com/ (Accessed 2 November 2008). 
43 James Reston "Nixon, Drugs and the War." New York Times (1857-Current file),  June 2, 1971,  
http://www.proquest.com/ (Accessed 2 November 2008). 
44 Robert Young, "Special Stress on GIs in Viet: Nixon Vows War on Use, Sale of Dope." 
45 Alfred W. McCoy The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (Chicago: 
Lawrence Hill Books, 2003), 443. 
46 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 75. 
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the overall quantity or price of illegal drugs in the U.S.47  However, the evidence 
presented in this chapter for the Caribbean theater indicates improved interdiction and a 
decline in the quantity of drugs reaching the U.S. market through this transit area. This 
means that increased interdiction in the Caribbean was more than offset by the increased 
use of less secure alternate shipping routes, which allowed supply to increase and price to 
fall in the U.S. market. This chapter seeks to explain the success in the Caribbean, with 
the understanding that this success was achieved through redirecting rather than reducing 
the overall flow of drugs.  The findings show that the key to success was improved 
coordination and capacity.  The first section considers the uncoordinated parallel efforts 
of the 1980s. The second section covers the period 1989 to 1994, during which U.S. 
interagency coordination and maritime security capacity were slowly improving, and the 
first vestiges of international cooperation began appearing, at a time when drug 
trafficking through the region was continuing to grow. The next section covers 1995 to 
2001, during which interagency and international coordinated efforts were improved 
through formalized agreements and guidelines, and drug trafficking began shifting away 
from the Caribbean. The final section examines 2002 to the present, a period of rapid 
escalation of U.S. and international maritime security capacity within the established 
international coordination agreements.  This chapter shows that the overall trend seen in 
nearly thirty years of data, despite some periods of initial setbacks, is an overall decrease 
in the drug flow through the Caribbean, suggesting a causal link between increased 
coordination and maritime security capacity and decreased drug flow through the 
Caribbean. 
The Caribbean is defined as all of the island states in the Caribbean Sea and 
continental states with a Caribbean coastline. While the War on Drugs includes all 
methods of entry into the United States and all types of drugs, this chapter focuses 
specifically on the Caribbean maritime transit zone and cocaine, the primary drug moving 
through this region.  Two indirect measures of the dependent variable, the level of drug 
                                                 
47 “National Drug Control Strategy: Data Supplement 2009,” Office of National Drug Control Policy 
(January 2009) 
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs09/ndcs09_data_supl/09datasupplement.pdf 
(Accessed 1 May 2009), 70. 
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flow, are used.  The first is the annual number of cocaine seizures (Figure 1). The second 
is the quantity of cocaine seized annually (Figure 2).48  An increase in the number of 
seizures over a given period of time is taken as an indication that drug interdiction is 
improving, and thus drug flow into the United States through the Caribbean is declining.  
However, a decrease in total quantity of cocaine seized over a given period of time is 
taken as an indication that a lower quantity of drugs is being trafficked through the area, 
so that the decrease indicates a decrease in the total amount of drugs flowing through the 
Caribbean.  When examined in conjunction with each other, an increase in the number of 
seizures and decrease in quantity seized in the same year is taken as the clearest 
indication of declining drug flow through the Caribbean. The first independent variable is 
level of coordination of counterdrug efforts, which is consistently mentioned but poorly 
tested as an explanatory factor in the counterdrug literature. Coordination is measured at 
the national (interagency cooperation) and international (bilateral and multilateral 
agreements) levels. This independent variable will be analyzed qualitatively, by looking 
at the type and timing of various levels of interagency and international level 
coordination. The second independent variable, maritime security capacity to man, train 
and equip counterdrug security forces, is also often mentioned but poorly explained 
and/or tested in the literature, though it is much more quantifiable. There are also 
qualitative aspects of capacity, such as the timing of a new platform being utilized in 
counterdrug efforts. 
                                                 
48 Figures for 2004–2008 include jettisoned cocaine, generally thrown overboard by traffickers being 
pursued by law enforcement.  See: U.S. General Accounting Office. Coast Guard: Relationship Between 
Resources Used and Results Achieved Needs to Be Clearer, Report to the Subcommittee on Oceans, 
Fisheries, and Coast Guard, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S. Senate, GAO-04-
432, 18. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=gao&docid=f:d04432.pdf (Accessed 
20 April 2009). 
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Figure 1.   Kilogram Equivalents of Cocaine Seized in the Caribbean by Year49 
 
 
Figure 2.   Number of Drug Seizures in the Caribbean per Year50 
                                                 
49 UN Office on Drugs and Crime Report Viewer 
https://ras.unodc.org/ReportServerPublic/Pages/ReportViewer.aspx?%2fSeizures%2fSeizuresChartTimeSi
m (Accessed 14 April 2009), [input parameters: Americas, Caribbean, Cocaine, 1980–2006]. 
50 Ibid, [input parameters: Americas, Caribbean, Cocaine, 1980–2006]. 
 17
It should also be noted in keeping with the literature’s general focus toward the 
overall drug war, the duality of maritime success as described in this chapter and overall 
drug war failure is reinforced as seen in Figure 3. From  1981 to 1988, the street price of 
cocaine was decreasing while purity was increasing, and then from 1988 to the present, 
the purity has remained relatively constant while price continues to decrease, indicating 
and overall annual surplus of cocaine on the U.S. market.  This is not indicative of 
operational level successes as described in this chapter regarding maritime counterdrug 












































































Cocaine Purity (%) Price Per Gram (PPG) ($)  
Figure 3.   Price and Purity Indices of Cocaine in the U.S. by Year51 
 
                                                 
51 “National Drug Control Strategy: Data Supplement 2009,” 63. 
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A. 1981–1988: UNCOORDINATED U.S. CAPACITY BUILDUP 
After the extent of the international drug flow became understood in the late 
1970s, the Reagan Administration championed the International Security and 
Development Act, which included funds designated for a new International Narcotics 
Control (INC) program. This led directly to the establishment of the first overseas Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) field offices in 1981.52  Part of their mission was to provide 
intelligence cueing for shipments leaving ports and if able, to actually stop the shipments 
from departing. The U.S. Coast Guard, originally under the Department of 
Transportation, had been involved in counterdrug operations in the “primary maritime 
interdiction role” of forward deploying its cutters and patrol craft to the far reaches of the 
Caribbean and beyond to stem the flow of illegal drugs since 1973.53  In 1982 the 
Department of Defense authorized Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments 
(LEDETs) to serve on U.S. Navy ships to execute boardings and arrests in support of the 
drug war.54  The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 formalized the Coast Guard’s role in the 
air interdiction of illegal drugs, and even allowed the Coast Guard to operate U.S. Navy 
aircraft originally designed for a war with the Soviets.55  The DEA was undertaking 
similar but uncoordinated operations with the same general mission.56  The Department 




                                                 
52 Drug Enforcement Administration: A Tradition of Excellence, Drug Enforcement Agency, United 
States Department of Justice (2003) http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/history/history_part1.pdf (Accessed 14 
December 2008), 46. 
53 “Drug Interdiction Overview,” United States Coast Guard 
,http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/drug_interdiction.asp (Accessed 2 June 2009); “United States Coast 
Guard: America’s Maritime Guardian,” Coast Guard Publication 1 (1 January 2002)  United States Coast 
Guard http://www.uscg.mil/top/about/doc/Chapter_Two.pdf (Accessed 14 December 2008), 34. 
54 “August: It Happened in August,” The Foundation for Coast Guard History 
http://www.fcgh.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17&Itemid=26 (Accessed 14 
December 2008). 
55 “Major Events in Coast Guard Aviation History,” United States Coast Guard 
http://www.uscg.mil/history/uscghist/aviationchron.asp (Accessed 14 December 2008). 
56 Drug Enforcement Administration: A Tradition of Excellence, 46. 
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and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1982, marking the first true interagency 
cooperation in the War on Drugs, although both agencies fell under a single department, 
the Department of Justice.57  
Despite being generally uncoordinated and often parallel, all of these efforts had 
two short-term effects. First, the number of seizures increased in the late 1980s from near 
zero in the early 1980s as the screen created by increased patrolling netted more 
traffickers (Figure 2), an initial success for the maritime forces that was reversed as drug 
trafficking cartels adapted in the following years. Also countering this success was that 
the amount of cocaine seized grew from near zero in 1980 to just over 10,000 kilos 
annually in the late 1980s (Figure 1), indicating more drugs were flowing through the 
Caribbean at the end of this time period. 
B. 1989–1994: ENHANCED U.S. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND 
MARITIME SECURITY CAPACITY 
Improved interagency coordination of military support for counterdrug efforts 
began in earnest with the formalization of the Anti-drug Abuse Act of 1988 and the 
Defense Authorization Act of 1989, which provided the Department of Defense with 
specific responsibility for detecting and monitoring (D&M) suspected drug trafficking 
aircraft and watercraft in the Caribbean, provided for communications support to the 
counterdrug efforts and coordination of National Guard support.58  Communications 
support was established through “a Department of Defense Law Enforcement Agency 
C4I network integrating all Department of Defense and civilian law enforcement agency 
command and control networks.”59  The Anti-Drug Abuse Act “eliminated the NNBIS 
[National Narcotics Border Interdiction System] and NDPB [National Drug Policy 
Board], and in its stead substituted the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) 
which was to create a coherent policy to unify the thirty-odd agencies whose activities 
                                                 
57 Drug Enforcement Administration: A Tradition of Excellence, 46. 
58 Monroe, x–xi. 
59 Ibid, 13. 
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involved counter-narcotics work.”60 The reorganization of oversight into the ONDCP 
was recognition of the need to formally coordinate a whole government effort between all 
stakeholders in the war on drugs at the domestic strategic level. The new legislation 
included mandates for methods and organizational changes, particularly in the 
Department of Justice and its relationships with other agencies, which were not 
formalized into law prior to 1988.61 
On 10 January 1989, the U.S. Department of Defense established military Joint 
Task Forces Four (JTF–4), Five (JTF–5) and Six (JTF–6) to coordinate and execute its 
anti-drug mission.62  `JTF–4 was charged with “interception of illicit traffic in the transit 
zone,” specifically the air and water space of the Caribbean. 63  It answers to U.S. 
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), whose “focus is assisting in the training of 
indigenous country law enforcement agencies in eliminating the source of the 
problem.”64  The establishment of the JTFs improved coordination within the military at 
the operational and tactical levels, formalizing procedures and communications between 
assets from various branches, including the army and navy. SOUTHCOM’s operations 
remained parallel to the uncoordinated interagency effort, so the military continued to 
duplicate many of the DEA’s efforts. After JTF-4’s first full year of operation, and 
following an unexplained spike in total drugs seized, which almost doubled from 1989 to 
1990 (Figure 1), newly coordinated military and Coast Guard efforts resulted in a 
downward trend from 1990–1993 in the quantity of cocaine seized concurrent with a rise 
in cocaine seizures, indicating that over this time frame, the overall flow of drugs through 
the Caribbean was decreasing (Figures 1 and 2). The ebb and flow of the quantity of 
drugs seized and total seizures is indicative of the beginnings of a process of constant 
adjustment and readjustment at the tactical level by the cartels. 
                                                 
60 Monroe, 15. 
61 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Public Law 690, 100th Cong., 2d sess. (18 November 1988) Library 
of Congress Thomas Archive http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d100:HR05210:@@@L&summ2=m& (Accessed 2 June 2009). 
62 Monroe, 14. 
63 Ibid, 14. 
64 Ibid, 14. 
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Cocaine was trafficked primarily on commercial aircraft and ships through the 
Caribbean in the 1980s.  One of the tactical measures taken by maritime security forces 
included increased vigilance and inspections at air- and sea-ports of entry in the early 
1990s, which forced traffickers to shift away from commercial air and cargo ships toward 
small air and sea craft.65  With this shift, the various agencies involved were faced with 
stepping up patrolling in the six million square mile maritime domain for vessels not 
subject to international protocol for electronic broadcast of their identity or location. 66  
The private aircraft threat was effectively countered relatively quickly by the DEA-led 
and JTF-supported Operation Emerald Clipper, which began in 1991, and has been 
directly augmented by the deployment of three DEA-airplanes used for transportation and 
surveillance.67  Emerald Clipper’s mission has been to disrupt the flow of private aircraft 
into and out of a defined transit zone that includes the Caribbean. Supporting resources 
employed in the operation have included military aircraft, as well as resources from the 
Coast Guard, DEA, and FAA. Over the first ten years of operation, Emerald Clipper’s 
combination of military forces and law enforcement methods allowed for the successful 
seizure and destruction of over 160 aircraft belonging to drug cartels, assets valued at 
over $200 million.68  Members of Operation Emerald Clipper worked with Congress 
through the Commerce Department to ban export of new aircraft to many cocaine source 
countries, showing the value of effective communications improving feedback all the 
way to the strategic level.69 These combined efforts had an effect of reducing the use of 
private aircraft by drug cartels to a negligible level by the early-2000s.70 
In response to improved inspections of cargo ships at ports of entry, traffickers 
also “developed high powered Low Profile Vessels (LPVs) or ‘Jamaican war canoes,’ 
                                                 
65 Monroe, 29. 
66 Rachel Neild, “U.S. Police Assistance and Drug Control Policies,” in Drugs and Democracy in 
Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy eds. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, 61–98 (Boulder, CO: 
Lynn Reinner, 2005), 81. 
67 Donnie R. Marshall, “DEA Congressional Testimony,” U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (1 





which relied on camouflage, stealth and high speed to evade detection and avoid capture. 
In time LPVs were modified in nature and acquired the sobriquet ‘go-fast’ boats, 
denoting a boat whose crews frustrated interdiction attempts chiefly by high speed.”71 
These vessels also could make their way at night through use of Global Position System 
(GPS) equipment.72  In response, military and law enforcement agency (LEA) “forces 
channeled traffickers into predictable routes,” utilizing applied force to establish a 
maritime barrier, which affected a significant disruption in trafficking.73  Although “go-
fasts” could often outrun a ship, the helicopter detachment onboard could easily match 
their speed and hunt them down once they were confined to predictable routes.  When 
pursued by helicopters the go-fasts would typically jettison cargo, making arrest and 
prosecution virtually impossible, but nevertheless reducing the supply of narcotics 
entering the U.S. market through the Caribbean.74 
By January 1994, JTF–4 was reporting large increases in both the amount of 
jettisoned cargo by traffickers and delays in the shipments of the cartels.75  There was a 
temporary drop in the quantity of drugs reaching the U.S. overall, as the estimated 
quantity available for consumption in the U.S. dropped from 528 metric tons in 1990 to 
345 in 1994.76  This period of rudimentary informal coordination and cooperation 
between various government agencies left many inefficiencies in information sharing and 
intelligence cueing across agency lines.  However, the value of such coordination was 
recognized by the ONDCP and Department of Defense, which then worked together in 
Washington to formalize the relationships between agencies, leading to the establishment 
of the Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) in 1995. 
                                                 
71 Monroe, 30 and xii. 
72 Ibid. The sophistication and modification of a fleet of high performance speed boats may have 
increased shipment costs for the cartels, although speed may have increased overall deliveries and thus 
overall profits.   
73 Ibid, 28. 
74 Ibid, xiii. 
75 Ibid, 28. 
76 “National Drug Control Strategy: Data Supplement 2009,” 62. 
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C. 1995–2001: CONSOLIDATION OF U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION 
The State Department and the DEA had always been closely associated with 
forward maritime counterdrug operations, although there had been no formal 
coordination. Without formal coordination guidelines, agencies were seen to be 
figuratively stepping on each others toes and communication paths were not in place to 
adequately and accurately hand off traffickers to the appropriate assets through 
intelligence cueing. This essentially amounted to opportunity costs while more drugs 
were allowed to slip past the screen before true coordination began. Recognition of the 
potential value of intelligence cueing from the embedded DEA country teams for U.S. 
maritime operations led to the inauguration of a revolutionary new organizational 
construct to enhance communication between various U.S. agencies and the military. 
Presidential Decision Directive 14 (PDD14) of 1995, together with the National 
Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICC), established the Joint Interagency Task 
Force East (JIATFE), which replaced JTF–4.77  JIATFE had a military commander, 
supported by a staff made up of all branches of the military, along with a liaison or 
deputy director from each of the stakeholder agencies, to include the FBI, DEA, 
Treasury, ATF, INS, FAA, and Coast Guard. It established a formal unity of effort, more 
than ten years after the first use of military assets. Figure 1, shows an overall decrease in 
total quantity of cocaine seized by all involved agencies from 1994–2001, indicating a 
success in terms of fewer drugs transiting the Caribbean over the same time frame. The 
improved coordination and information sharing of this time period also enabled a higher 
proportion of all maritime seizures to take place on the high seas, where the Coast Guard 
is the primary executor, as interdicted by increased Coast Guard specific seizures, which 
increased consistently from approximately 29,000 kilos in 1994 to well over 68,000 kilos 
every year, usually topping 90,000 kilos.78  
                                                 
77 Simultaneously, JIATF West replaced JTF–5 under U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), and JIATF 
South replaced JTF–6, under SOUTHCOM. Monroe, 89. 
78 Converted from pounds to kilos. U.S. Coast Guard, “Coast Guard Drug Removal Statistics,” U.S. 
Coast Guard Office of Law Enforcement http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/Drugs/stats.asp (Accessed 15 
April 2009). 
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While national level coordination has been critical to improving maritime drug 
operations by the U.S., coordination and cooperation with international allies also 
improved, contributing to interdiction success from the mid-1990s. The Netherlands, 
Spain, Belgium, France, Canada and the United Kingdom have had an historic interest in 
the security of the Caribbean, based on colonial ties and/or economic interests. Most 
European states also have an interest in counterdrug efforts, since an estimated “30 
percent of the drugs entering Europe from Latin America pass through the Caribbean.”79 
The relative ease of air travel between former colonies and their colonizers makes it all 
the more important for European powers to interdict drugs before they reach the island 
states of the Caribbean. 80  A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed 
between the United States and the Royal Netherlands Navy in June 1994, which provided 
for intelligence sharing and formalized cooperation, placing a Royal Netherlands Flag 
Officer in Curacao to provide command and control for forward deployed Dutch Naval 
Forces subordinate to the American led JIATFE. 81  Other bilateral agreements were 
signed around this time between the United States and both the Netherlands and United 
Kingdom, allowing U.S. Coast Guard LEDETs on non-U.S. naval ships, which accounted 
for 58 percent of the total cocaine removed for the reporting year 2003, up from 10 
percent in 2000.82 
Cooperation with Caribbean states improved land originated intelligence cueing 
from local law enforcement agents, although agreements between the U.S. and Caribbean 
states were often weakened by low levels of political will to engage within Caribbean 
governments and limited local capacity to assist counterdrug effort. By March 1997 all 
Caribbean states, except Cuba, had signed Maritime Anti-Drug Agreements with the 
United States, but engagement ranged from begrudging or reluctant participation to 
                                                 
79 Jorge Rodriguez Beruff and Gerardo Cordero, “The Caribbean: The ‘Third Border’ and the War on 
Drugs,” in Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy eds. Coletta A. Youngers 
and Eileen Rosin, 303–338 (Boulder, CO: Lynn Reinner, 2005), 306–7. 
80 Suzette A. Haugton, “The Jamaica-Britain Border and Drug Trafficking,” The Round Table 96, 390 
(1 June 2007), 280. 
81 Monroe, 24. 
82 James M. Loy, “The Transit Zone: Strategy and Balance,” U.S. Senate Drug Caucus (15 May 
2001), http://drugcaucus.senate.gov/transitloy.html (Accessed 2 June 2009) and “Coast Guard Drug 
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enthusiastic cooperation. Those countries offering the most support (Colombia, Bolivia 
and Jamaica) were those most affected by “the corrupting power of the drug cartel.”83  
This locally inspired political will to engage facilitated the development and full 
implementation of bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements.  Caribbean states 
less negatively impacted by the activities of the drug cartels were less inclined to engage 
fully in counterdrug efforts, despite increasing pressure from the United States. 
Nevertheless, improved coordination and cooperation with international elements on the 
ground enabled greater communication to the JIATF commanders and SOUTHCOM 
itself, which contributed to more participation in maritime operations by the host states, a 
friendlier response to U.S. and allied operations in their vicinity, and increased and 
improved intelligence gathering and cueing between assets and authorities. Other 
cooperative arrangements between the U.S. military and motivated Caribbean states, such 
as Operation Tradewinds, an annual exercise with Jamaica started in 1991, and Fuerzas 
Unidas-Counterdrug in Colombia in 1995, also increased cooperation, coordination and 
communication between states, facilitating the more efficient, and in some cases 
previously non-existent, flow, coordination and centralization of actionable counterdrug 
trafficking intelligence through the JTF commanders.84 
As more and more agreements were signed, as represented by a simple binary 
summation of total agreements in Figure 4, overall information and effort coordination 
and cooperation led to an increased number of seizures in numerous countries based on 
the increase in actionable intelligence from the late 1990s to 2001 (Figure 2).  
Furthermore, during the initial increase in maritime counternarcotics agreements being 
signed in 1994 and 1995, the overall total quantity of cocaine seized in the Caribbean 
spiked (Figure 1) since the United States could now conduct operations in other states 
territorial waters with standing permission, a major provision known as a “shiprider” 
cause of many of these agreements, whereas before the United States was limited in its 
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ability to enter such areas.85  The link between these agreements and the growing number 
of seizures is even clearer in country specific data.  The Dominican Republic, for 
instance, saw a spike in the total quantity seized in 1995, the year it entered into a 
maritime counter-drug agreement (Figure 5).86  Haiti shows a similar spike in 1997, the 
year corresponding to its maritime agreement with the U.S. (Figure 6).87  Both states 
experienced a drop back to pre-agreement seizure levels in the following years, as 
traffickers shifted to less risky routes through less heavily patrolled waters. The United 
States also worked to build the capacity of its partners by providing them with much 
needed equipment, such as compatible communications packages and surveillance 
radars.88  It transferred more than 25 decommissioned watercraft to Caribbean states 
between 1995 and 2001, including patrol boats, buoy-tenders and lifeboats, all of which 
have been used to increase patrols in their territorial waters.89  Aside from bilateral 
training agreements and exercises, the U.S. footprint was often minimal, as local states 
“cooperated in the construction of radar facilities for monitoring airborne and water borne 
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Figure 4.   Quantity of Bilateral International Agreements Between Caribbean States and 
the United States by Year91 
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Figure 6.   Cocaine Seizures by Year for Haiti93 
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The success of U.S. led maritime interdiction efforts in the Caribbean in this 
period is evidenced by the declining levels of cocaine seized there in conjunction with the 
increase in trafficking through Mexico.94  The number of seizures was increasing, while 
the quantity seized was decreasing, indicating that drugs still passing through the 
Caribbean were being shipped on smaller boats, which were increasingly being caught in 
the tightening Caribbean screen.  However, this success was partly a result of the relative 
ease of trafficking through the sanctuaries of Mexico and the Eastern Pacific, which gave 
the cartels a viable path of less resistance, leading them to shift operations away from the 
Caribbean rather than reducing them overall. Figure 7 shows cocaine passing through the 
Caribbean and Eastern Pacific maritime environments as a proportional total maritime 
trafficking (i.e., excluding Mexican land trafficking). While the Caribbean accounted for 
well over 50 percent of maritime trafficking in the late 1990s, since 2000 it has accounted 
for less than 50 percent, and often below 25 percent.    
                                                 













1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Caribbean Eastern Pacific  
Figure 7.   Percent of Maritime Interdictions Eastern Pacific vs. Caribbean by Year95 
D. 2002–2009: CAPACITY ESCALATION  
The steep increase in the number of seizures beginning in 2002 was the result of 
an operational and strategic adjustment associated with the Patriot Act and other 
supporting legislation adopted in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Drug trafficking was now identified as a source of financial and logistical support for 
terrorist organizations, leading to dramatically increased resourcing as the War on Drugs 
became part of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). A monumental shift in operational 
and strategic mentality, which now viewed drug trafficking as supporting a tangible 
physical enemy with Clauswitzian ramifications rather than as a spectral social threat,  
allowed for the tactical application of previously restricted resources, including nuclear 
powered submarines in a clandestine intelligence gathering, cueing and monitoring, 
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which added the tactical advantage of stealth.96  Submarines, along with human 
intelligence, communications intelligence and overhead imaging resources (newly 
prioritized and enhanced for the counterdrug mission as a result of the linking to the 
GWOT) all contributed to the increase in number of seizures after 2001 (Figure 2).  
Despite this increase in resources overall, the specific Coast Guard presence, 
measured by ship days on station, declined by approximately two thirds between 2001 
and 2005 due to a reprioritization of Coast Guard specific mission assets following the 
September 11th attacks.97 This means that the increase in seizures took place despite a 
significant decline in the number of patrol vessels, indicating an increased efficiency of 
patrols, brought about by the additional assistance provided to the remaining Coast Guard 
patrols by non-Coast Guard assets such as submarines. International cooperation in the 
region also improved after 2001.  Treaties with Caribbean states increased by 
approximately 50 percent as preexisting agreements were strengthened. Some states also 
signed on to the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which brought additional 
resource and security assistance (Figure 4).98  
One example of the benefits of the increased cooperation is Operation Kingfish, 
initiated in 2004 by the United States, United Kingdom and Jamaica. Within two weeks 
of formalizing a law enforcement and maritime cooperation pact, Jamaican and UK 
authorities captured three boats destined for Jamaica carrying over $4 billion in cocaine; 
a seizure many authorities claim would not have been possible without Kingfish.99 This 
cooperation contributed to a remarkable jump in Jamaican seizures, which had held 
steady at nearly zero before Operation Kingfish.  After the 2004 seizure, which was 
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credited to the UK rather than Jamaica, Jamaican authorities stepped up efforts in its own 
territorial waters and airspace, landing its first major drug seizures in over twenty years in 
2006.  
 
Figure 8.   Total Cocaine Seized by Year for Jamaica100 
Traffickers responded to increasingly effective interdiction efforts by shifting to 
the use of semi-submersible vessels beginning in 2005.  Documents seized from an 
alleged builder of these vessels in Colombia indicate a construction cost of $1 million per 
vessel, with a carrying capacity of eight to ten tons of cocaine, with an approximate street 
value of $250 million.101 A survey of the global boat brokerage website, Boats.com, 
indicates that a typical go-fast boat, approximately 50 feet long, can cost as much or more 
than the $1 million dollar price tag of the semi-submersibles.  The trade off is that a go-
fast can typically only carry approximately one ton of cocaine and is much easier to 
detect, meaning that the semi-submersibles have an overall higher chance of success and 
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result in a higher payout. 102 Though the detection and subsequent loss of such a large 
quantity of product poses an economic risk to the cartels, the drastically increased 
potential profit, and the more elusive nature of this method of transport, as well as the 
drastically reduced requirement for a large number of attempted shipments to move the 
same quantity of drugs, all suggests that this method represents a tactical improvement in 
drug trafficking. However, despite the advent of semisubmersibles for Caribbean 
trafficking, the overall cocaine flow continued to shift away from Caribbean routes in 
response to the coordinated maritime response.  In addition to the shift in maritime flow 
toward the Eastern Pacific (Figure 7), overland routes through Mexico saw a substantial 
increase in their share of the cocaine flow into the U.S., from under 60% in the late 1990s 
to 90% in 2006 (Figure 9).103 Thus, the maritime strategy in the Caribbean proved 
effective, but because alternate shipping routes remained less secure the total flow of 
drugs into the U.S. was not substantially affected.104 The United States is attempting to 
transfer the lessons learned in the Caribbean to the Pacific.  In 2008, it enhanced its own 
maritime security capacity by establishing the Fourth Fleet, answerable to SOUTHCOM, 
in an attempt to replicate the success in the Caribbean in the Eastern Pacific. 105 
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Figure 9.   Percent of Total Drug Flow into U.S. via Mexico106 
E. LESSONS FROM MARITIME COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS IN THE 
CARIBBEAN 
This chapter has shown that counterdrug efforts in the Caribbean were effective 
after 1995 at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and that this success was 
largely attributable to increased cooperation and coordination between U.S. government 
agencies and between the U.S. and international partners, as well as increased tactical 
presence.  While the smugglers have eluded definitive defeat through constantly evolving 
tactics in response to counterdrug operations, the tactical responsiveness of counterdrug 
efforts provide for short term successes and long term reduction in Caribbean smuggling. 
The increased counterdrug presence and coordination led to reduced Caribbean 
trafficking at a time when trafficking along other smuggling routes grew substantially, an 
achievement of no small import. Unfortunately this success was also offset at the national 
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policy level by a failure to more fully implement the counterdrug strategy, leaving gaps 
in the Pacific and Mexico through which traffickers continued to operate.    
The overarching lessons learned from the War on Drugs in the Caribbean are the 
value and positive impact of coordinated operations and increased maritime presence, but 
also the adaptability of the traffickers to new U.S. and allied tactics. The evidence has 
shown that presence alone, even by the most capable state on the planet, is not enough to 
form an adequate screen without both internal and international cooperation and 
coordination in a maritime environment as vast as the Caribbean. Furthermore, traffickers 
rapidly adapt to any tactical challenge presented by the U.S., its allies and their available 
technology.  Therefore, the U.S. and its allies have had to remain vigilant and adaptive.  
Increased international cooperation and coordination proved a valuable facet of 
the drug war in the Caribbean.  Leveraging existing political will to engage, as is the case 
with extraregional allies such as the UK and Netherlands, or cultivating it through 
partnerships, such as those with Columbia and Jamaica, serves to enhance counterdrug 
operations across the region. The Caribbean states also have an important role to play in 
the effectiveness of coordination and cooperation at the operational and tactical levels 
and specific country comparisons have shown that increased political coordination and 
interaction serve to facilitate tactical level reductions in drug trafficking and an increase 
in drug seizures. 
Advocates of the current strategy suggest that with more resources tactical 
success could lead to strategic success by making the maritime screen tighter and denser, 
and extending it to the Pacific.  The successes in the Caribbean suggest that if such a 
strategy were employed across all maritime (and overland) smuggling routes, a more 
permanent and overarching victory might be achieved. Yet the dedication of so many 
agencies and resources to such an effort, one that must be continuously maintained, 
almost certainly requires the sacrifice of some other aspects of U.S. national security, 
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III. ANTIPIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
Piracy has long been a scourge of maritime nations. References may be found as 
far back as Herodotus’ warning of their fatal exploits and the need for civilized people to 
act against them. In Roman times, the perpetrators of piracy were known as “hostis 
humani generis,” or an “enemy against all mankind.”107  Great Britain, at the height of its 
imperial strength, battled pirates in every ocean it sailed.108  The first international 
military operation conducted by the United States was against piracy on the Barbary 
Coast of Tripoli in 1801–1805.109  While the pirates of the past were concentrated on the 
major trade routes of the Caribbean, Mediterranean, and Southeast Asia, the latter 
experienced exceptional international attention beginning in the 1990s as global trade 
grew significantly and the region became host to an ever increasing quantity of global 
shipping. 110 
This chapter analyzes recent antipiracy operations in Southeast Asia at the 
strategic, operational and tactical levels from 1991 through the present.  As in the 
counterdrug analysis, it identifies two primary contributors to effectiveness: coordination, 
at both the national (interagency cooperation) and international levels (bilateral and 
multilateral agreements), and maritime security capacity to conduct antipiracy operations, 
including the ability to man, train and equip antipiracy security forces.  Each of these 
factors is again found to be dependent upon the emergence or creation of the political will 
to engage, in this case in serious antipiracy measures.  This chapter shows that the values 
of these two independent variables increased throughout the 1990s, peaking in 2001 
when Southeast Asian antipiracy efforts, previously regional in nature, expanded to 
include extra-regional involvement.  This is shown to have had an immediate and 
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sustained impact on the dependent variable, level of piracy in the region. While the 
explanatory factors are the same for counter-drug efforts in the Caribbean and counter-
piracy operations in Southeast Asia, this chapter shows that whereas the maritime 
security capacity to conduct operations in the Caribbean increased prior to international 
cooperation, the inverse is true for Southeast Asia, where international coordination and 
cooperation increased prior to increases in maritime security capacity. 
Southeast Asia includes the Indo-China Peninsula (Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, 
Myanmar, West Malaysia, and Singapore) and the surrounding South China Sea, Gulf of 
Thailand, Strait of Malacca and Indian Ocean.  The thousands of islands in the 
Indonesian Archipelago (17,508) and the Philippines (7,107) are also part of the 
Southeast Asian maritime region, providing numerous safe havens for shallow draft 
pirate watercraft.111  The Strait of Malacca is a strategic sea lane of communication 
(SLOC), along which approximately 15 million barrels of crude oil and many other key 
items of global commerce are transported each day on the estimated fifty thousand 
vessels that transit this 1.7 mile wide body of water each year.112  The area of analysis in 
this chapter includes the Straits of Malacca, along with the territorial waters of Singapore, 
Malaysia and Indonesia, from 1991, when robust data was first collected, through 2008.  
The dependent variable is measured by the number of piracy attacks. This chapter 
uses the definition of a piracy attack as set by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), 
specifically, “an act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or other crime 
and with the capability to use force in the furtherance of the act.”113  This definition 
enhances the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) definition by including 
not only classical piracy that occurs on the high seas but all maritime crime with the 
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exception of unarmed petty theft.114  It should be noted as well that the IMB’s statistics 
include all attempted attacks, whether or not they succeeded.  A decrease in the number 
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Figure 10.   Piracy Attacks in Indonesia and South East Asia 115 
One indicator of the independent variable maritime security capacity is the 
number of maritime craft available for antipiracy patrols and operations per 100 miles of 
coastline. Figure 11 shows the number of patrol craft for the three countries of study, 
while Figure 12 shows the relative maritime security capacity of each state over time 
based on patrol craft per 100 miles of coastline. Indonesia has one watercraft per 100 
miles of its coastline, while Malaysia has hovered between three and six, and Singapore 
has 100, dwarfing the other two countries in capacity to patrol its own territorial waters. 
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This chapter uses the same expanded concept of maritime security capacity as the 
counterdrug chapter by giving credence to training, interoperability equipment and 
exercise experience, all of which enhance the ability of the limited resources to perform 
their functions more effectively. Due to the relatively constant level of maritime security 
capacity in terms of assets available to combat piracy, as illustrated in Figures 11 and 12, 
this chapter focuses more heavily on the incidences of training exercises and programs as 
the main source of capacity building than the counterdrug chapter does. 
 



















Figure 11.   Total Maritime Security Craft per Country by Year116 
                                                 







































NOTE: Singapore has 
approximately a one-to-
one ratio and is far off the 
upper end of this scale.
 
Figure 12.   Maritime Security Craft per 100 Miles of Coastline by Year117 
Whereas drug trafficking primarily targets the United States in the Caribbean, this 
chapter shows that because piracy directly threatens each state in the region, national 
level actions do reduce piracy.  Nevertheless, to be truly effective across an entire region, 
cooperation and maritime security capacity building must extend beyond the individual 
stakeholder countries to the region as a whole.  Furthermore, regional antipiracy 
operations are shown to be further enhanced when cooperation and maritime security 
capacity building are extended to the international levels. 
A. ECONOMIC FACTORS  
It is well understood that the level of piracy is significantly affected by economic 
forces on land, which are treated as a condition variable and not studied directly here.  
Although piracy was already growing rapidly during the economic expansion of the mid-
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1990s, it spiked in 1998–2000 as “a result of the Asian financial crisis that began in 
Thailand in late 1997 and political instability in Indonesia, which led to 
underemployment and unemployment of thousands of people” (Figure 10).118 With 
increased incentives for piracy on land, antipiracy efforts at sea had to be stepped up to 
increase disincentives, mainly the risk of doing pirate business. Thus antipiracy efforts at 
sea push back against economic incentives generated on land, and as a result any analysis 
of antipiracy must remain cognizant of the effects of economic forces.  
Piracy attacks in Indonesian waters grew from 47 in 1997, at the start of the 
financial crisis, to 119 in 2000, as the financial crisis acutely affected the general 
population in the country.119  Economic pressures aggravated civil unrest and 
government violence in Indonesia, further contributing to the spike in piracy, which 
spilled over into Malaysian, Singaporean and international waters, leading to a nearly 
three-fold increase in Southeast Asia as a whole during the same time period.120  This 
economic dynamic exposed the inadequacy of existing antipiracy operations.  In the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, as regional economies began to recover, piracy 
rates as a whole dropped off from a peak of 242 attacks in 2000 to 54 attacks in 2008, an 
overall decrease of over 75 percent.121  The percentage of ships targeted by pirates while 
transited the Strait of Malacca also fell from 37 to 10 attacks per 10,000 ships, also a 
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Year Attacks Shipping Percent per 10K 
1999 161 43965 0.366 36.6 
2007 70 70718 0.098 9.8 
Table 1.   Total Piracy Rate in Southeast Asia vs. Traffic123 
These drastic reductions in total attacks and piracy rates occurred while regional 
per capita Gross National Incomes (adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity) was growing at 
an average annual rate of about seven percent (Table 2).  Since piracy was increasing, but 
at a slower rate, during the economic expansion of the early and middle 1990s, the 
sustained reductions in piracy after 2000 cannot be fully attributable to economic forces. 
This remainder of this chapter argues that while the economic recovery surely reduced 
the incentives for piracy, the increased cooperation and maritime security capacity 
building in antipiracy efforts were also significant contributing factors to the reduction in 
piracy incidents to well below immediate pre-financial crisis levels by 2008, which, given 
the growth of shipping in the intervening years, constituted an even greater reduction in 
the piracy rate.  
 
Country 2000 2007 Percent Change
Indonesia 2,240 3,570 59 
Singapore 32,740 47,950 46 
Malaysia 8,350 13,230 58 
Table 2.   GNI (PPP) per capita by Year124 
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B. 1991–1997: INITIAL EFFORTS AT COMBATING PIRACY  
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia responded to increasing levels of piracy with 
different levels of domestic political will to engage the piracy threat and with different 
maritime security capacities to do so (Figures 11 and 12).  On one end of the spectrum 
was Singapore, whose minimal coastline and comparatively large economy enabled it to 
more easily step up policing and patrols as the political will to engage emerged. 
However, that same small coastline, and thus limited territorial waters, limited its 
operational reach, since it very quickly ran into other states’ territorial waters. Malaysia 
was in the middle of the spectrum, with less political will to engage as indicated by ease 
of response than Singapore but more than Indonesia, and with less maritime security 
capacity relative to its longer coastline (and facing two oceans) than Singapore but more 
than Indonesia. At the other end of the spectrum, is Indonesia, with little political will to 
engage in this period, and “a coastline twice as long as the circumference of the earth, 
and with no more than a few dozen operating vessels to patrol its territorial waters.”125  
Domestically or internationally, demands for action against piracy always come 
primarily from the commercial sector, whose large transport ships make up the vast 
majority of pirate targets worldwide.126  The International Maritime Organization (IMO), 
a professional association of commercial shippers and government representatives 
worked in conjunction with the UN to establish the International Maritime Bureau in 
1981 under the International Chamber of Commerce to serve as an informational and best 
practices clearing house for all interested parties.127  While the IMB provided little value 
in antipiracy operations during the 1980s, the establishment of the Regional Piracy 
Center (RPC) in 1992 did begin to have a noticeable effect.  “The RPC’s operational brief 
is to act as an information and broadcasting center, liaising with regional law 
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enforcement agencies”128 to increase maritime domain awareness. It morphed into the 
Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) in 1992, chartered with the same tasks on a global scale. 
One of the first major indications that regional information sharing was contributing to 
improved antipiracy operations was the role played by the PRC’s information sharing 
across international jurisdictions, which led to the location and recovery of the hijacked 
MV ANNA SIERRA and its cargo and arrest of the pirates involved in 1995.129 
By the mid-1990s, the growing interdependence of Southeast Asian economies 
formed a nexus for state security cooperation.  The varying degrees of ease of response to 
political pressure and state economy resulted in each state participating in regional and 
international cooperation efforts in different ways and at different times, though the 
overall trend for all three states was increasing over this time period. Eventually, 
however, piracy came to be viewed as a common threat to the interdependent regional 
economy, and Southeast Asian states began to cooperate and share information following 
the establishment of the RPC in 1992.130  Joint patrolling and information sharing 
between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore (generally limited to sharing information via 
radio on unfolding incidents of piracy to “hand off” the incident to the applicable 
sovereign state) led to the substantial drop in piracy attacks between 1992 and 1993  
(Figure 13).131 
                                                 
128 Peter Chalk, “Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 
21, 1 (January 1998), 100. 
129 International Maritime Bureau, Piracy Annual Report (1 January—31 December 1995), (Kuala 
Lumpur, January 1996), 4–5. 
130 Rosenberg and Chung, 60. 
131 Victor Huang, “Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia,” Naval War College Review, vol. 
61, no. 1, pp. 87–105 (Winter 2008), www.proquest.com (Accessed 17 October 2008), 97. 
 46
 
Figure 13.   Total Piracy Attacks and Attempts in Southeast Asia per Country132 
The Singapore government, responding to demands of relatively powerful 
economic actors, such as the Singapore National Shipowners Association (SNSA), took 
the lead in regional cooperation in the early 1990s.133  Since Singapore flagged vessels 
travel throughout the region, SNSA pressure resulted in Singapore contributing to 
regional maritime intelligence services, through a vessel traffic information system 
consisting of radars, navigational charts, and data recording, in order to better protect 
their interests when sailing outside their own territorial waters. 134  During this 
timeframe, Indonesia and Malaysia simply reaped the benefits of the rudimentary 
information systems developed by Singapore. 
                                                 
132 Data compiled from International Maritime Bureau Annual Reports on Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships 1991–2008 (Kuala Lumpur) 
133 SNSA became the Singapore Shipowners Association (SSA) in 2003. 









1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010





Indonesia was actually more involved in some forms of maritime security 
capacity building from extraregional sources than others states in the region.  While all 
three states began personnel exchanges amongst themselves in the 1990s, Indonesia was 
the only one to include U.S. personnel in the exchange program, participating in 
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises, whose scope 
“broadened to build understanding and interoperability further.”135  Neither Malaysia nor 
Singapore was involved in this program during this timeframe. Despite such efforts, the 
training to more effectively employ their limited state maritime security assets proved 
ineffective in reversing the trend in piracy in Indonesia, as state resources were directed 
towards combating and containing land based internal threats against the Suharto 
dictatorship, despite the continually improving coordination and cooperation amongst the 
three states. 
Following the initial drop in piracy from 1992 to 1993, piracy rates in Singapore, 
Malaysia, and the Straits of Malacca remained flat, indicating a sustained reduction in 
those areas through 1997.  However, Indonesia saw a dramatic trend toward increasing 
piracy that continued right through the Asian Financial Crisis, driven by increasing 
lawlessness on land, political unrest and relatively weak state capacity to respond to these 
developments.136  Because most Southeast Asian piracy occurs in Indonesia, this 
produced an upward trend in the piracy data for the regional as a whole.  
C. 1998–2001: INADEQUACIES EXPOSED 
The more rapid and broad based upswing in the regional piracy rate driven by the 
financial crisis provoked step up responses to piracy within and outside Southeast Asia, 
including numerous initiatives at the national, regional and international levels that both 
enhanced and added to coordination and cooperation agreements and maritime security 
capacity through increased manning, training and equipping of antipiracy forces. National 
level coordination in Singapore continued to be pushed by the SNSA.  Its initial response 
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to the growing threat was to lobby the Singapore government to respond more effectively 
to the pirates’ actions.  However, it soon assumed direct responsibility for making official 
recommendations to constituent private shipping companies as well as to governments 
about how to better protect the crew, goods and ships, along with increasing maritime 
domain awareness (MDA), both through the IMB and other means of public 
communication.137  
Absent a lobbying force on the scale the SNSA, the Malaysian government felt 
less pressure from the commercial sector than did Singapore to engage in antipiracy 
operations, and more challenged by its limited maritime security capacity, which was 
actually decreasing during this time frame (Figures 11 and 12).  Before the Asian 
Financial Crisis, Malaysia’s maritime security capacity deficit had been partly balanced 
by the benefits that accrued from the activities of the (PRC), which is located in its 
capital, Kuala Lumpur. For example, PRC authorities noted in 1999 that the majority of 
attacks in Malaysian territorial waters were armed robberies and hijackings of fishing 
vessels.138  After being alerted to this trend, the Malaysian government increased the 
number and types of patrols in their territorial fisheries, added law enforcement 
helicopters, and placed all antipiracy assets under a newly created Eastern Police 
Command dedicated to addressing this piracy prone area.139  The Malaysian authorities 
also advised fishermen to operate in close vicinity and large groups so that they could act 
as early warning for each other. 140 By redirecting and coordinating its limited maritime 
security capacity, Malaysian efforts led to a drop in attacks against fishermen, though this 
was offset by increases in other types of piracy elsewhere in Malaysian territorial waters, 
leaving the overall piracy rate unchanged (Figure 13). This shows how regional 
coordination can have a direct effect tactically, but also illustrates that limited capacity 
can only be applied to a finite number of piracy missions. Even after this demonstration 
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of the inadequacy of its maritime security capacity, in 2001 Malaysia took no steps to 
augment its fleet of 52 patrol craft – only 10 of which were operational at any given 
time.141 A further illustration of weak maritime security capacity occurred when the 
Malaysian Navy, recognizing the value that training and exercises with extraregional 
actors could bring to their limited forces, agreed to take part in such exercises with Japan, 
but only after Japan paid for the fuel required by the participating Malaysian ship.142 
In contrast to both Singapore and Malaysia, Indonesia demonstrated no political 
will to engage beyond the national level in this period. Even though President 
Abdurrahman Wahid came to power in 1998 with a stated goal of expanding the 
Indonesian Navy to enhance maritime security, he was initially unable to pursue this goal 
due to limited state resources and continuing domestic political turmoil.143 In the same 
way that Malaysia drew upon the PRC to compensate for its lack of capacity, Indonesia 
drew upon extra-regional assistance. While Singapore and Malaysia had piracy largely 
under control by 2002, and resisted extra-regional patrols of their waters (and still do), 
Indonesia embraced external assistance, including extraregional patrols.144  It began 
accepting foreign military assistance and sales from the United States and Australia, 
along with financial aid from Japan, in 2000.145  By qualitatively improving its 
quantitatively fixed capacity with training, exercises and operating cost assistance, 
Indonesia was able to achieve a substantial reduction in piracy from 119 in 2000 to 91 in 
2001, though the level increase again in 2002 and 2003 in response to internal political 
disarray.146  Such a relationship, where coordination and cooperation in engaging in 
                                                 
141 Rohan Sullivan, “Southeast Asian Economic Ills Encourage a Plague of Piracy,” Los Angeles 
Times (13 May 2001), www.proquest.com (Accessed 21 May 2009). 
142 John F. Bradford, ‘Japanese Anti-Piracy Initiatives in Southeast Asia; Policy Formulation and the 
Coastal State Responses,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 26, no. 3, 480–505, www.proquest.com 
(Accessed 17 October 2008), 501. 
143 Angel Rabassa and John Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, 
Politics and Power, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003) RAND Corporation Website  
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1599/ (Accessed 20 My 2009), 12–4. 
144 Rosenberg and Chung, 55; International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against 
Ships Annual Report (1 January–31 December 2000), (Kuala Lumpur, January 2001), 12. 
145 Huang, 91–2. 
146 International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report (1 
January–31 December 2005), (Kuala Lumpur, 31 January 2006), 5. 
 50
antipiracy are all sound in Indonesia, but the capacity is lacking is the exact inverse of the 
Malaysian case discussed above, where coordination was based on simply utilizing the 
PRC information resources and exercises relied on donated fuel, despite Malaysia having 
a relative ships per 100 mile advantage over Indonesia. 
At the regional level, the pressure for cooperation increased in 1999, when the 
“chairman of the Federation of ASEAN Shipowners Association (FASA) issued a strong 
call for immediate action from ASEAN member governments to combat piracy.” 147  One 
result was the development of Singapore’s $840 million satellite-based ship identification 
system, which was made available to other states in the region.148  This system fed the 
PRC, acting as an information conduit for patrol vessels without intelligence cueing, 
which was insufficient to contain the growing level of piracy.  At the same time, regional 
and international business interests continued to act directly in support of regional 
cooperation.  The PRC established new information sharing and cooperation agreements, 
and established Surface Picture (SURPIC), “a technical system that allows information 
sharing between Singapore and Indonesian command and control (C2) centers in order to 
achieve a common operating picture in the Singapore Strait, facilitating communication 
and enforcement” in 1997149  In 1998, the IMB (parent organization to the PRC) 
deployed a satellite based ship tracking system called SHIPLOC.150  In 1999 the IMB 
began a weekly piracy reporting summary service on its website to provide more 
actionable data to the international community and shipping companies. 151 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that such intelligence and information gathering and 
sharing initiatives had an immediate impact.  It led to the arrest of Chew Cheng Kiat, a 
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Singaporean ship hijacking mastermind, in Indonesia in 1998.152  Indonesian authorities 
who conducted the arrest credited “rapid and well organized intelligence” for the capture 
of Kiat’s phantom ship, the MT PULAU MAS.153  Rapid dissemination of actionable 
intelligence also led to the recovery of the MV ALONDRA RAINBOW and arrest of its 
hijackers in 1999. After the ship went missing, the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre sent out 
a description of the vessel to regional agencies, militaries and shipmasters in the area. 
Over the course of a month, numerous ships sighted the MV ALONDRA RAINBOW and 
passed her location to the IMB Centre. After comparing information it was realized the 
pirates had flown a deceptive Belize flag, which did not match any registry. Ultimately, 
the Indian Coastguard was able to detain the ship and arrest the pirates for prosecution.154 
Events such as these highlight the growing importance of robust communication and 
coordination amongst a regional group of states where the whole, becomes much greater 
than the sum of its parts in terms of individual state maritime security capacity.  
Nevertheless, overall piracy continued to balloon. 
D. 2001–2008: ADVENT OF EXTRAREGIONAL COORDINATION 
The limited impact of increased cooperation within Southeast Asia on piracy led 
to requests for outside support in increasing maritime security capacity, through aid, 
purchases from foreign military suppliers, and external assistance in patrolling regional 
waters. The initiation of bilateral and multilateral exercises and patrols with extraregional 
partners improved the interoperability and communications between all participants after 
Japan and India became directly involved in 2000 and 2001, respectively. Over the 
course of the 2001–2005, the Japanese Coast Guard established routine bilateral exercises 
with India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Brunei, Indonesia and Singapore, with an 
emphasis on law enforcement and coordination, as opposed to military patrols, because of 
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political sensitivities about deployment of Japanese forces outside its territorial waters.155 
Japan also conducted personnel exchanges with all of these states for immersion style 
training and exposure to how other forces operate in an anti-piracy posture.156 Other 
existing exercises founded for unrelated purposes also began including antipiracy 
training. The Japanese led Maritime Pollution Exercise (MARPOLEX), which 
commenced in 1988 to improve interoperability between Japan, Indonesia and the 
Philippines in combating natural disasters, added a focus on antipiracy in 2001.157 
Following Japanese calls throughout 2000–2003 for combined international anti-piracy 
exercises in Southeast Asia at regional conferences, other regional and international 
organizations began a series of anti-piracy training exercises in 2004 and 2005. Through 
the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), Australia, New Zealand and the UK 
committed themselves to the common defense of former crown colonies Malaysia and 
Singapore, which included antipiracy training in routine military exercises starting in 
2004.158  India’s presence in the region increased with the Coordinated Patrol (CORPAT) 
agreement between it and Indonesia in 2002, which focuses on antipiracy among other 
maritime security issues.159 
While these training exchanges and exercises enhanced the effects of military and 
law enforcement assets by both bolstering regional forces and maintaining extraregional 
presence that could respond to reports of pirate attacks in a timely manner, the largest 
paradigm shift occurred after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when the U.S. 
presence in the region expanded from humanitarian aid to direct military assistance based 
on the particular needs of each individual state. Military sales, donations and training, 
through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and 
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coordinated exercises increased the maritime security capacity of Southeast Asian states 
to act against piracy improving their ability to efficiently and effectively use the limited 
resources at their disposal. The United States added counter-piracy to its existing Cobra 
Gold exercises in the South China Sea in 2005.160  The United States also established 
numerous new bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism exercises, such as Operation 
Deep Sabre in 2005, which developed tactics with crossover value in the realm of 
antipiracy at sea.161  The United States sponsored Container Security Initiative (CSI) and 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) of 2003 prompted Singapore, one of the first 
signatories, to consolidate its port security, establish small craft tracking in its territorial 
waters and place private security firm personnel on Singaporean flagged vessels.162  
Malaysia, with two major ports, became a signatory in mid 2004, though it has yet to sign 
on to the PSI.163 
In conjunction with increased extra-regional assistance, cooperation and 
coordination, states and regional bodies continued to improve their own maritime security 
capacity qualitatively. Regional measures included expanded promulgation of best 
practices for shipping companies by the IMB, along with new defense and coordination 
systems. SHIPLOC, which was formally adopted and made a requirement of all ships 
registered with the IMO in 2002, includes a concealable transmitter that communicates 
with the ship owner and regional and international authorities by providing multiple 
position reports per day, as well as a security alert feature for when a ship comes under 
attack.164  Building on its always strong military presence, Singapore established the 
interagency Maritime and Port Security Working Group in 2003, linking its navy, coast 
guard and law enforcement efforts at port and sea lane security. 165  Singapore also 
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“install[ed] tracking devices on all Singapore-registered small boats that identify location, 
course and speed” as part of its participation in the U.S.-led Container Security 
Initiative.166  In 2004, the IMB reporting system and improved Indonesian aircraft and 
patrol boat capabilities led to a hijacked Singaporean tug being recovered two days 
later.167  In 2005, the IMB sponsored the “Eyes in the Sky initiative to enhance 
surveillance by combined maritime air patrols.”168  “Previously, each state had conducted 
air surveillance patrols only within its own airspace. This new program allows combined 
air patrols across territorial boundaries, allowing for better effectiveness in the narrow 
straits as well as promoting operational cooperation.”169  All of these initiatives show the 
increasing level of cooperation and coordination between agencies, regional and 
international partners.   
Indonesia, recovering from the fall of the Suharto regime and the resulting civil 
war, was focused on internal development and so lacked the political will to engage to 
combat the spread of piracy until 2003. Emerging from internal disarray, the newly 
established and empowered national government charged its maritime security apparatus 
to focus its sights on piracy.  After a lag to reorganize and refocus the limited maritime 
security forces, the first significant unilateral push by Indonesia to curb piracy was a “full 
scale maritime operation code named Gurita 2005, which … increased naval and air 
patrols in the straits.” 170  This increase in naval and air presence contributed to 
decreasing incidents of piracy in Indonesian territorial waters from 94 in 2004 to 79 
attacks in 2005, to 50 attacks in 2006, a two year drop of almost 50%. 171 
At the national level, Indonesia finally found the political will to engage in 2003, 
having recovered from the fall of the Suharto regime and the resulting civil war. 
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Emerging from internal disarray, the new government charged its maritime security 
apparatus to focus its sights on piracy.  After a lag to reorganize and refocus, it launched 
its first significant unilateral antipiracy push, a “full scale maritime operation code named 
Gurita 2005, which … increased naval and air patrols in the straits.”172  This increase in 
naval and air presence contributed to decreasing incidents of piracy in Indonesian 
territorial waters from 94 in 2004 to 79 in 2005 and 50 in 2006, a two year drop of almost 
50%. 173  Indonesia also received, and accepted, special attention starting in 2004, given 
its extraordinarily high incidence of piracy.  It was the only country in the region to 
accept U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) training to enhance 
security and readiness for all types of operations, including piracy. 174  It also received 
$700,000 to improve the marine security training center in Jakarta, the installation of 
twelve coastal radar stations in 2004, and the donation of fifteen high-end patrol craft to 
the Indonesian coastal police, which restored Indonesia’s maritime security capacity to its 
1999 levels, an increase of almost 8 percent (Figures 11 and 12).175  While incidents of 
piracy in Indonesia remain high compared to other states, piracy in Indonesia declined at 
a higher rate than other states in the region from 2002 to 2008, demonstrating that 
Indonesia’s embrace of international assistance, and the resulting cooperation and 
coordination, has had a more direct impact on piracy than in Malaysia or Singapore, 
where local and regional efforts were largely sufficient to contain the threat. The overall 
impact of increased international involvement through exercises, training and maritime 
security capacity building is clearly visible in Figure 10 as total incidents of piracy begin 
a constant decline in 2004, which correlates with the increased international presence, 
coordination and cooperation in the region. 
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E. LESSONS FROM ANTIPIRACY EFFORTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
The cumulative effect of all of the interagency and international cooperation and 
coordination in Southeast Asian waters can be seen in the overall downward trend from 
the piracy peak in 1999 following the Asian Economic crisis, and the consistent 
downward trend since 2004. Relatively vast direct and indirect ant-piracy efforts have 
been in place in the Southeast Asia region since the 1990s, but the evidence indicates that 
the most significant and sustainable declines in piracy occurred in Indonesia, as a result 
of increased maritime security capacity drawn from international involvement in the 
region as well as continually increasing and improving regional cooperation and 
coordination since 2004. While the findings indicate the maritime security operations had 
a significant effect on the rate of piracy in Southeast Asia, it should be remembered that 
economic conditions were also improving during this period, and the balance between the 
economic and security effects cannot be precisely determined based on existing evidence. 
 57
IV. CONCLUSION 
A. LESSONS FROM COUNTERDRUG AND ANTIPIRACY OPERATIONS 
The preceding chapters examined international efforts at combating the illegal 
flow of drugs through the Caribbean and maritime piracy in Southeast Asia. Each showed 
that years of learning and building national and international coordination and capacity 
eventually led to reductions in drug trafficking and piracy, respectively, in the two 
regions.  In both cases, effectiveness of maritime efforts improved significantly only 
when capacity and coordination both reached levels that allowed for a systemic, whole 
government, multilateral approach and more importantly were applied in conjunction 
with each other. 
Counterdrug efforts were initially U.S. dominated, and largely uncoordinated 
among the U.S. agencies involved.  A slight improvement in effectiveness immediately 
after the U.S. formalized internal coordination in 1989, was swamped in following years 
by the explosive growth of the drug trade indicating a large setback as the cartels adapted 
their methods.  Only when systematic interagency and international coordination was 
established in 1995, through the JIATFs and the advent of numerous international 
agreements, was the maritime counterdrug capacity more fully realized and ushered in a 
sustained period of increasing successes. The combination of interagency and 
international coordination interacted with the preexisting capabilities in the area to 
increase the number of seizures and decrease the weight of cocaine seized, as drug 
trafficking shifted to Mexico and the Pacific to avoid the tighter net that had been cast as 
a maritime screen in the Caribbean. With the increase in maritime counterdrug capacity 
after 2001, including deployment of nuclear powered submarines and more international 
training and exercises, seizures increased as a fast pace, while weight seized continued its 
downward trend.  This suggests that the dragnet was catching more vessels with smaller 
loads, further indicating the decline of the region as a major trafficking route. 
Antipiracy efforts in Southeast Asia developed in an inverse way compared to the 
counterdrug effort in the Caribbean. Regional coordination came before an appreciable 
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increase in maritime security capacity, and coordination without capacity proved as 
ineffective as maritime security capacity without coordination had in the Caribbean. Over 
the timeframe of 1997–2000, the region saw a three-fold increase in piracy, a spike that 
held steady in Indonesia, even as the rest of the region began to get a hold on the newly 
aggravated threat by improving its own maritime security coordination and capacity. 
With mechanisms already in place to effectively share information and provide 
intelligence cueing, each state in the region was faced with improving their own capacity 
through purchase and donation of equipment from extraregional allies, accepting aid in 
the form of training and exercises, and establishing more robust systems, such as radar 
and satellite communications, to support the cooperation and coordination.  Though 
Indonesia initially lagged Malaysia and Singapore, by 2004, even it had come around, 
embracing extraregional assistance to compensate for its meager capacity leading to a 
faster decline in piracy than in the region as a whole. 
Taken together, the two cases suggest that coordination and capacity are both 
necessary but not sufficient factors in effectively combating maritime security threats.  
Both must be present at sufficient levels for effective operations against drug traffickers 
and pirates.  Political will to engage in counterdrug and/or antipiracy operations was 
shown to be a necessary condition for both increased cooperation and increased capacity 
building That will developed in each state’s government as it came to feel that its own 
interests were directly threatened, motivating the increase in capacity and cooperation. In 
the counterdrug case, only the U.S. had the political will to engage until the mid-1990s, 
when it was joined by Caribbean states that recognized threats from the drug to their own 
national interests. Hence, U.S. capacity increased significantly before formal cooperation 
and coordination agreements, which had to await the emergence of political will 
elsewhere. At the strategic level, the law of unintended consequences is very applicable 
to the successful counterdrug efforts in the Caribbean maritime domain, for as the 
percentage of drugs entering the United States through Mexico, that state began to 
destabilize, which in turn could turn out to be a greater threat to U.S. national security. 
In the piracy case, national and regional ship owner associations provided the 
initial motivation for developing regional information sharing and cooperation 
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agreements, as well as the political pressure that generated the political will to engage. 
Yet, economic conditions had an appreciable effect in Southeast Asia as well, where the 
Asian Financial Crisis exacerbated the weaknesses of the existing state and regional 
maritime security capacity to combat piracy at the time. Even following the piracy spike, 
the states in the region placed an emphasis on retaining their sovereign independence in 
the face of coordinated operations with their neighbors and at the prospect of 
extraregional patrols by states like the U.S. or Japan. The regional states did, however, 
accept aid, foreign military sales and training in various forms, all of which increased 
their maritime security capacity, which, as it converged with the existent regional 
cooperation and coordination, led to the dramatic decline in recent years of piracy in 
Southeast Asia. 
B. APPLICATION OF LESSONS TO COASTAL SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
The United States has a growing vested interest in the security of African states, 
and especially their maritime security, as outlined in the National Security Strategy and 
other guiding strategic documents. Some of the threats directly affect U.S. interests, such 
as oil infrastructure in the Gulf of Guinea and global trade routes like the Gulf of Aden 
off the Horn of Africa. Extraregional allies of the United States, such as the European 
Union, have similar interests, and are also more directly affected by the trafficking of 
drugs, persons and weapons.  The threat of piracy looms large off of the Horn of Africa 
and to a lesser extent in the Gulf of Guinea. The various forms of trafficking, particularly 
that of drugs, are prevalent in the Gulf of Guinea and West Africa.  All of these factors 
explain why there is a growing international political will to engage these maritime 
security threats, and generally, when a global actor like the United States or European 
Union become involved, they can provide a short term bolstering effect to maritime 
security capacity in the region by supplying their own ships and personnel to the fight. 
African states themselves can be directly affected by lawlessness at sea, through 
lost revenues and an unattractive security environment for international businesses that 
rely on the maritime domain.  African states are further affected by other forms of 
lawlessness that involve fish poaching and environmental degradation.  The governments 
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are generally affected by various levels of corruption and theft associated with the shore 
based enterprises of these maritime crimes.  Sub-Saharan African maritime security 
capacity is severely lacking, even compared with Southeast Asia or the Caribbean and if 
their political will to engage is both cultivated and translated to action in the near term, 
they will be heavily reliant on extraregional forces to patrol their waters, as is the case 
with Somalia, which lacks both capacity and a government. Essentially, the majority of 
Sub-Saharan African states a combination of the same initial political conditions as 
Indonesia of the 1990s in the antipiracy fight and Caribbean states that have not felt 
threatened by the corrupting influence of the drug trade. So, in order to apply the lessons 
learned from the Caribbean and Southeast Asia, existing arrangements must be examined 
as an entering argument for the United States to build upon in order to best assist Sub-
Saharan African states secure their own waters ultimately. 
First, as both the Caribbean and Southeast Asia have shown, robust international 
cooperative agreements and operations could have a positive impact on the maritime 
security environment in Sub-Saharan Africa. Regional security cooperation is almost 
non-existent.  The African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development (SADC) and the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAC) all have some form of security 
apparatus subordinate to their overarching economic development goals, but actual 
capacity and coordination is minimal, and there is no focus on maritime aspects of state 
security. The recently formed Gulf of Guinea Commission has done nothing to face 
maritime security challenges other than hold a few public conferences. So, while the 
political framework exists in the form of regional economic forums, the United States and 
its allies would have to foster an expanded role and authority within each of these 
frameworks that moves all interested parties toward an internationally coordinated 
solution.   
At the operational level, basic steps have been taken regarding piracy off the Horn 
of Africa, with a regional piracy reporting center in the initial stages of setup and 
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operation in Kenya.176  Numerous global powers have sent ships to the area to ensure 
safe passage of global shipping, and are coordinating loosely with each other, including a 
few interested African states, reinforcing the entering assumption that generally, African 
states do not view these incidents as a threat to their own government, in a manner 
similar to the Caribbean states of the 1980s and early 1990s. Furthermore, the United 
Nations has moved for the first time in its history to allow entry into Somali territorial 
waters by international security forces when in hot pursuit. Therefore, if the United States 
or its allies felt the same political or economic interest to counter threats in the Gulf of 
Guinea, they could build upon this momentum and work to establish similar procedural 
and institutional infrastructure in the Gulf of Guinea. 
However, since, according to guiding strategic documents, the United States 
would ideally like African states to secure their own waters, supporting national and 
regional capacity and cooperation building is critical. Furthermore, the generally low 
economic capacity of African states means the expense of manning, training and 
equipping an adequately sized maritime security force is beyond their reach.  Therefore, 
if the political will to engage in maritime security operations can be generated, the 
capacity to do so will have to be outsourced for the foreseeable near term.  Such 
measures as a permanent forward operating naval base may be necessary in the Gulf of 
Guinea, to house at least a JIATF, or potentially a new numbered fleet, such as in 
SOUTHCOM, depending on how long analysts think the United States would have to 
coordinate allied operations in the sub-region. It should be understood that every amount 
of effort and capacity the United States adds to the fight takes away from its ability to 
meet other commitments around the globe. 
On top of extraregional allies actually patrolling the waters, the manning training 
and equipping of African states can essentially be outsourced to these same allies. In a 
similar fashion to Southeast Asia, the United States and its global partners could easily 
provide ships and aircraft, along with the training to operate them.  Also, drawing the 
experience in the Caribbean, extraregional powers could provide coastal radars and 
                                                 
176 Staff Reporter, “Anti–piracy centre opens in Kenya,” BBC (5 May 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4978506.stm (Accessed 10 June 2009). 
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communications infrastructure to willing countries in order to not only enhance 
individual state’s maritime security capacity, but also bolster international coordination 
and cooperation effectiveness. Furthermore, military training exercises and personnel 
exchanges could increase the effectiveness of African states’ their limited maritime 
security capacity to combat drug trafficking and piracy, along with all their other 
maritime security threats. 
While this thesis shows that an ideal mix of high levels of international 
coordination, exemplified through cooperative and information sharing agreements, 
exercises and capacity building, along with high levels of maritime security capacity, 
either homegrown or provided by extraregional outsiders, can bring about dramatic 
positive results in both countering drug trafficking and antipiracy efforts, it cannot be 
forgotten that there are other factors continuously affecting the maritime security 
environment worldwide.  While the United States proved effective at interdicting 
maritime shipments of cocaine through the Caribbean, the same amount made it across 
the border through Mexico, while at the same time destabilizing that country.  The 
economic factors affecting the rate of piracy in Southeast Asia are not completely 
understood either, in terms of how much of both the upswing in 1998 and the following 
downswing truly affected the piracy rate, particularly in Indonesia.   
Were the United States or its global allies to recognize a need to raise the priority 
of assisting regional states in securing the maritime environment in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
this thesis provides general guidelines for how to establish an effective internationally 
coordinated maritime security force of adequate capacity to counter the threats facing all 
peaceful states. 
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